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Jurisdiction‐Granting:
Legislative Capacity and
Ideological Distance

Keywords: Jurisdiction; judicial power; district court; Congress; legislative capacity; ideological
distance
This paper examines the conditions under which Congress passes jurisdiction-granting legislation, legislation that
expands the discretion of the federal district courts by designating them as venues in which policy questions are to
be heard. This project extends existing research that has demonstrated that Congress manipulates the parameters of
jurisdiction by examining the manner in which Congress routinely engages in this activity. I construct and evaluate
a comprehensive dataset of laws in which Congress grants jurisdiction to the district courts for the period between
1949 and 2000 with the goal of explaining conditions under which Congress grants jurisdiction Two explanations
are considered: higher levels of legislative capacity of Congress and the ideological distance between Congress, the
district courts, administrative agencies. The results demonstrate that both legislative capacity and ideological
distance are important to understanding the passage of jurisdiction-granting legislation.

Introduction
On June 22, 2010, Judge Martin L. C. Feldman of the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana issued a preliminary injunction that lifted the Obama
Administration’s six-month moratorium on off-shore drilling, a moratorium spurred by the BP
Deepwater Horizon oil spill. Injecting the courts into the “largest accidental oil spill in history,”
the judge reasoned that Secretary of the Interior Kenneth Salazar had acted in an “arbitrary and
capricious” manner when creating the moratorium, words that are often the death knell for
government action under review by a federal court.1 Commentators and news accounts focused
their attention on the impact of the court’s decision and the quick-to-follow revelation that Judge
Feldman owned stock in “several energy-related firms,” at least through 2008, often with only
passing reference to the legal basis for the court’s reasoning.2 Readers of ABC News were
informed only that “the Administrative Procedure Act” authorized the kind of review undertaken
in this case.3 Missing from this coverage was an account of why the federal district court was in
a position to make a decision that could so frustrate the Obama Administration’s response to the
Gulf spill and disaster.
The present study places questions of why federal courts are in a position to make policy
decisions in the center of analysis. My focus is somewhat unusual in that I emphasize the
manner in which Congress creates opportunities for judicial policy-making and the frequency
with which this takes place. In contrast, many scholars focus on what courts do with cases once
they get them. The fact that courts are able to decide those cases is usually taken for granted as a
fixed feature of the institutional environment. In reality, however, the power of courts to hear
cases is the result of a complex and ongoing process through which actors outside the courts,
particularly members of Congress, shape and reshape the power of different courts to hear
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particular types of disputes. That process involves, among other things, efforts by Congress to
limit or protect the discretion of regulatory officials, to alter which people or groups of people
have standing to bring cases to court, and to assign particular types of disputes to particular
courts.
In the case discussed above, laws such as the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (the
APA) create opportunities for federal courts to participate in the public policy process. Courts
are designated through the APA as venues in which individuals and groups may bring suit to
challenge administrative agency action. The APA represents just one mechanism through which
Congress creates policy-making authority for the federal courts. Constitutionally, Congress has a
host of powers with respect to the federal courts including the power to create courts, staff
courts, fund their operations, and define their jurisdiction. Indeed, the Constitution is relatively
silent regarding the federal judiciary as it does not establish any federal courts besides the
Supreme Court, and includes very little detail about how even that court is structured. The
Constitution instead specifically delegates the power to establish the federal judiciary, including
federal judicial procedure, to Congress. Courts do not appear fully formed and do not come
armed with jurisdiction to hear all types of cases but rather depend on Congress to establish the
conditions under which they will operate.
Recognizing the manner in which Congress exercises its constitutional power with
respect to the courts is important for understanding how courts operate in American politics. In
one view, how courts operate can be understood by examining the judges who staff the courts
and exploring the factors that explain their behavior. These accounts of judicial behavior often
focus on the “backgrounds, attitudes, and ideological preferences of individual justices” to
explain judicial decision making – hence preoccupation with Judge Feldman’s investing
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practices.4 In contrast, this article adopts an institutionally focused approach in which
“[s]cholars seeking to explore the broader cultural and political contexts of judicial decision
making … examin[e] how judicial attitudes are themselves constituted and structured by the
Court as an institution and by its relationship to other institutions in the political system at
particular points in history.”5 In contrast to court-centered or behavioralist approaches, the
theory presented here argues that Congress has played an integral role in influencing the creation
of opportunities for judicial decision making. Congress’s influence is felt when it designates
courts as policy venues leading individuals and groups to turn to the courts to address their
concerns.
In focusing on institutional factors that influence whether courts become involved in the
policy process, this work builds upon a small but growing body of scholarship that investigates
the conditions under which courts gain policy-making responsibility and authority. Whether and
how courts will participate in the policy process is not a fixed notion, but one open to
manipulation by other actors. Judicial participation in the policy process is routinely structured
through the language of statutes as members of Congress work to create opportunities for judges
to exercise discretion.6 This scholarship focuses on the “relationships between justices and
elected officials,” searching out ways in which elected officials “encourage or tacitly support
judicial policymaking.”7 The result is a way of studying and explaining judicial policy-making
in which scholars investigate the numerous mechanisms through which legislators share power,
responsibility, and blame with judges.8 This scholarship has also been attentive to reasons why
Congress may create opportunities for judicial policy-making, which includes advancing
political and policy goals.9 Legislators may wish to shift decision-making responsibility from
the legislature to the courts10 or to lock-in and advance policy goals,11 some of which may be
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difficult for legislators to achieve on their own.12 Legislators may additionally look to courts as
institutions that can provide an oversight function for the executive branch.13
The present study adds to our understanding by focusing on an additional mechanism
through which Congress empowers the judiciary. Congress makes choices about the jurisdiction
of the federal courts by passing jurisdiction-granting legislation. As defined here, jurisdictiongranting legislation is legislation that explicitly expands judicial discretion by designating courts
as venues through which certain specified categories of people or organizations may work to
address their claims. As a policy venue, or an “institutional location where authoritative
decisions are made concerning a given issue,” courts are established as institutions where certain
policy questions are to be answered.14
This project shares with existing research an interest in the “conditions that make it
possible for judges to rule”15 of which the manipulation of jurisdiction is one mechanism through
which courts are empowered.16 These studies show that there are deliberate efforts to expand
jurisdiction, and that those expansions add to judicial power. They have also begun to identify
some background political conditions that might lead legislators to expand jurisdiction. The
existing studies often do this by examining a few particularly dramatic or historically
consequential efforts to expand jurisdiction, an effort that has helped to show that manipulation
of jurisdiction is important and worth studying. My study builds on these findings by attempting
to provide an understanding of jurisdiction-granting as a routine occurrence. I do this by
surveying laws passed over a fixed period of time and identifying ones that alter jurisdiction. I
find that the number of such laws is surprisingly large, and that these laws cannot easily be fit
into conditions identified by earlier studies. Having this broader sample of the routine practice
of jurisdiction-granting makes it possible to step away from looking at only major cases, and
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looking only at realignment and regime change, and thus to see a broader variety of ways that
construction of judicial power is part of the give and take of ordinary politics. This project
focuses as well on the relationship between manipulation of jurisdiction and the agendas of the
federal courts. Existing scholarship has hinted at the implications of the manipulation of
jurisdiction on the agendas of the federal courts. That is, it is evident that when legislators work
to foist cross-cutting issues onto courts or write ambiguous language in statutes or otherwise
create opportunities for a court to control its agenda, new issues may appear on the agendas of
the courts. However, scholarship in this vein has focused on the underlying conditions that lead
to expansions of judicial power and has not explored the implications for agenda-setting and
agenda change. My study builds on these findings by focusing on the relationship between the
manipulation of jurisdiction and the agenda dynamics of the federal courts.
The present study addresses a gap in our understanding of the relationship between
congressional action and judicial decision making by investigating the conditions under which
Congress passes jurisdiction-granting legislation. It evaluates the passage of a comprehensive
set of laws that grant jurisdiction to the federal district courts for the 81st – 106th Congresses
(1949 – 2000). Using HeinOnline, 726 laws that explicitly grant jurisdiction to the federal
district courts were identified.17 As can be seen from Figure 1, jurisdiction-granting laws are
consistently and routinely passed. The number of laws passed ranges as high as 51 in the 93rd
Congress and at least 10 laws are passed per Congress.
[Figure 1 about here]
These data support the argument that Congress exercises its constitutional power to
determine the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Given the frequency with which it occurs, it
illustrates the importance of focusing on the conditions leading to the passage of jurisdiction-
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granting legislation. As Congress routinely grants jurisdiction to the federal courts it is an active
participant in deciding whether and how the courts will participate in the policy process. In the
pages that follow, I build upon these initial empirical findings in an attempt to demonstrate the
importance of studying congressional efforts to empower the courts. I first discuss existing
literature on why courts become involved in the policy process. Then, two explanations that
might explain the passage of jurisdiction-granting are considered. First, I explore whether
legislative capacity, conceptualized as the ability of Congress to produce a policy itself, is
associated with the passage of jurisdiction-granting legislation. I focus on legislative capacity to
determine whether internal, institutional characteristics of Congress are related to decisions on
how to structure the federal judiciary. Second, I examine whether the ideological distance
between Congress, the federal district courts, and administrative agencies is associated with the
passage of jurisdiction-granting legislation. The purpose of focusing on ideological distance is to
investigate the relationship between institutional characteristics between Congress, the courts,
and administrative agencies. Along with a new dataset of jurisdiction-granting laws introduced
above, a new measure of district judge ideology is constructed and employed for this analysis.
The results show that for the United States Senate, both legislative capacity and ideological
distance are important for understanding under what conditions Congress will grant jurisdiction
to the federal district courts.
Courts in the policy process
Motivating scholarship on the federal judiciary is the question of how courts come to
decide certain public policy questions. In one view, understanding which issues the Supreme
Court chooses to focus on is as simple as noting the Court’s discretionary control over its docket.
Given this discretionary control “the justices are free to accept or reject cases brought to their
7

attention as they see fit.”18 The Court decides the policy questions it does because justices
choose to focus on those questions. Of three major works that examine trends in the Supreme
Court’s agenda over time, each ascribes to the justices themselves the lion’s share of
responsibility for the Court’s agenda. Describing decreasing attention to economic issues in the
Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Courts, Segal and Spaeth link transformations in the Supreme
Court’s agenda to judicial preferences, asserting that “a likely explanation for these trends may
be the justices’ perceptions that business, labor, and tax matters have relatively little salience.”19
Pacelle writes that the “Court chose, in part because of external pressure, to limit its
consideration of some issues and to become a forum for others” after 1937.20 Lanier agrees, and
states that the Court “began to turn away from [economic regulation] and refocused its priorities
on questions of civil liberties-civil rights.”21 It is the justices, freed from outside influence, who
set the agenda and determine its direction.
In a second view, scholars investigate how opportunities for courts to review the
constitutionality of statutes or to interpret the meaning of legislative language arise, and conclude
that members of Congress work actively to create such opportunities.22 Graber, for example,
examines the ways in which judicial decision-making may be invited by policymakers regarding
policies that create “cross-cutting” pressures on legislative coalitions – policies such as slavery,
antitrust regulation, and abortion. Desiring to take a stand on the issue of slavery in federal
territories after the Mexican War, for example, elected officials went so far as to pass legislation
“that would facilitate federal judicial review of any complaint or habeas corpus petition that
raised the constitutional status of human bondage” and followed up by repeating the assertion
that slavery was an issue for the courts.23 In doing so, members of Congress took specific
rhetorical and legislative action to include the courts in the policy-making process. Shipan
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describes the existence of judicial review as the result of purposive legislative deliberation in
which participants in the legislative process both have the capacity to design judicial review and
may benefit from these designs. Shipan suggests that members of Congress may choose specific
types of judicial review in order to achieve certain policy goals. In granting a sympathetic
judiciary the power to review the decisions of an unsympathetic agency, for example, members
of Congress may do so with the idea that courts will protect their policy preferences against the
maneuverings of a hostile agency. Or, by granting broad discretion to a sympathetic agency and
denying judicial review over certain types of agency decisions, members of Congress may, in
this scenario, be depending on an agency to protect Congress’ policy preferences against the
maneuverings of a hostile judiciary.24
Constitutionally, Congress has a host of powers with respect to the federal courts
covering their creation, staffing, funding, and jurisdiction. Each has implications for the
judiciary from whether courts will exist and in what form (creation), who will occupy the judges’
chair (staffing), what resources they will have to complete their tasks (funding), and what issues
they will attend to (jurisdiction). Following the tradition of examining how courts are placed in
the position to make policy decisions, the present study focuses on jurisdiction-granting
legislation as one tool that Congress may use to involve the courts in the policy process. Much
like the drafting of ambiguous statutes25 or political party efforts to institutionalize policy gains
through the creation and staffing of courts,26 jurisdiction-granting legislation represents choices
made by members of Congress regarding whether to empower the judiciary. These decisions are
part of the legislative process.27 In the process of drafting legislation, members of Congress
decide whether the courts are to be granted jurisdiction and in what form such grants will take.
These decision are frequent and routine. Congressional attention to the courts is not reserved
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only for issues of major importance, but instead is an integral part of the legislative process on a
range of issues. As the examples in the next section make clear, congressional choice regarding
the courts takes a variety of forms, meaning courts may have a peripheral or central role to play
in the public policy process depending in part on how Congress envisions their role.
What emerges is a more complex picture of the reasons why courts are involved in
deciding public policy questions. In this conception, judicial forays into the policy thicket are
not the result of desire on the part of judges alone, but a function as well of legislatively-created
opportunities. Courts are able to review the language of statutes because Congress explicitly
includes provisions granting them the authority to do so. Complexity arises from the process of
tracing judicial decisions back to decisions made by other institutional actors to involve the
courts in the policy process. Court decisions are not the product of judicial deliberation alone,
but represent numerous influences, some external to the courts.
Building on this theoretical background, the next section explores in detail the reasons
why Congress might grant jurisdiction to the federal district courts. It examines the passage of
jurisdiction-granting legislation as a function of legislative capacity and ideological distance
between Congress, the district courts, and administrative agencies.
The decision to grant jurisdiction
Under what conditions will Congress grant policy-making authority to the federal courts?
Expansions of judicial power have been studied elsewhere as “the sort of familiar partisan or
programmatic entrenchment that we frequently associate with legislative delegations to executive
or quasi-executive agencies.”28 In treating the decision to grant policy-making authority to
courts as analogous to the decision to delegate to administrative agencies, this article draws on
parallels between the two situations. In both situations, Congress determines the costs and
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benefits of producing policy “in-house” versus the costs and benefits of allowing another entity
to produce the policy.29 Congress must overcome time, resource, and expertise challenges that
would otherwise prevent the legislative body from writing complex, detailed legislation itself.
Producing public policy is a time-consuming enterprise and Congress’s attention is split between
numerous activities. Institutional features such as the committee system provide members with
tools needed overcome cognitive limitations; nonetheless, Congress cannot attend to all issues
equally and producing legislation is a costly enterprise. Congress must also take into account the
relative ideological positions of administrative agencies and the courts themselves as part of an
effort to protect its policy preferences.
Research design
Jurisdiction-granting legislation
Public laws with provisions that grant jurisdiction to the federal district courts have been
identified for the time period between 1949 and 2000. Laws were identified using the advanced
search feature of HeinOnline’s U.S. Statutes at Large database to search for the following
combination of terms: “district court,” “district courts,” “court,” or “courts.” Through this
method, a set of 726 laws that grant jurisdiction to the federal district courts were identified. The
dependent variable Laws is a count of the number of jurisdiction-granting laws passed per
session of Congress.
Laws granted jurisdiction in one of six general categories. As the following examples
demonstrate, laws were considered to grant jurisdiction if provisions expanded the discretion of
the federal district courts. Through these provisions, courts become policy venues through
which individuals and groups may work to address their claims. First, laws granted jurisdiction
by authorizing civil actions. For example, the Federal Crop Insurance Act states that “[i]n the
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event that any claims for indemnity under the provisions of this title is denied by the
Corporation, an action on such claim may be brought against the Corporation in the United
States district court … and jurisdiction is hereby conferred upon such district courts to determine
such controversies without regard to the amount in controversy.”30 Second, laws granted
jurisdiction to the federal district courts by authorizing civil actions by the United States
Attorney General or by a federal agency. For example, the Housing Act of 1954 states that
“[w]henever he finds a violation of any provision of this section has occurred or is about to
occur, the Attorney General shall petition the district court of the United States or the district
court of any territory,” which are granted jurisdiction to “hear, try, and determine such
matter[s].”31
Third, federal district courts were at times designated as venues in which persons affected
by agency regulations could obtain judicial review of agency rules, regulations, or other agency
decisions. According to the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, for example, “[a]ny
applicant for a permit, or any party opposed to such permit, may obtain judicial review of the
terms and conditions of any permit issued by the Secretary under this section or of his refusal to
issue a permit. Such review, which shall be pursuant to chapter 7 of title 5, United States Code,
may be initiated by filing a petition for review in the United States district court for the district
wherein the applicant for a permit resides.”32 Fourth, in instances in which parties needed to
figure out the value of goods and services, the courts were granted jurisdiction to judicially
determine those values. Thus, for example, the Special Health Revenue Sharing Act of 1975
states that the “United States shall be entitled to recover … an amount bearing the same ratio to
the … value (as determined by the agreement of the parties by action brought in the United
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States district court for the district in which the center is situation)” as an amount of the project
in question that constituted the federal share.33
Fifth, a law could authorize a district judge to issue warrants or to seize goods for libel
such that, for example, “[a] fishing vessel … used in the commission of act prohibited by section
307 shall be liable in rem for any civil penalty assessed for such violation under section 308 and
may be proceeded against in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction thereof.”34
And sixth, the district courts could be tasked with enforcing subpoenas issued by a federal
agency as that agency works to enforce its rules and regulations. The Fisheries Act of 1995, for
example, states that “[i]n case of contempt or refusal to obey a subpoena served upon any person
pursuant to this subsection, the district court of the United States for any district in which such
person is found … shall have jurisdiction to issue an order requiring such person to appear and
give testimony … or to appear and produce documents.”35
Legislative capacity
Legislative capacity, also known as legislative professionalism, is a concept that captures
the resources available to a legislative institution. Often focused on state legislatures, studies of
legislative capacity are interested in examining the process by which legislatures gain the tools
necessary to perform essential legislative functions36 and in comparing the development of
legislative capacity in the states over time.37 Others examine the presence or absence or
legislative capacity, defining a “professionalized legislature as one with abundant resources.”38
The absence of legislative capacity may encourage delegation to administrative agencies.
This is because a legislative body may not possess the resources necessary to produce detailed
public policy itself and therefore needs to contract with another entity to help produce the policy.
Inability to write detailed legislation may stem from lack of time and other resources to write
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specific requirements or may stem from lack of knowledge on how to decide certain policy
questions. Delegation to agencies may help members of Congress overcome internal
informational disadvantages by empowering experts outside of the legislative branch.39 The
result may be a general statute that provides direction for administrative agencies to “fill in the
blanks.” What action the agency will take is something Congress cannot foresee perfectly and
their goal, as a result, is to structure administrative processes to ensure the policy unfolds as
desired and in accordance with congressional preferences.
If present, however, legislative capacity mitigates against the need to delegate to an
administrative agency as a legislature possesses the resources needed to produce detailed public
policy itself.40 Furthermore, legislative capacity may be related to the decision to grant policymaking authority to a court versus delegate to an administrative agency. As hypothesized by
Fiorina, Congress can either produce a detailed policy itself, enforced in the courts, or allow an
agency to fill in the details and enforce the legislation.41 Fiorina suggests that laws differ if they
grant policy-making authority to courts versus agencies, and that characteristics of Congress –
including capacity to write a detailed law – are related to whether authority is granted. 42
The legislative capacity literature suggests the following hypothesis:
H1: Increased legislative capacity will lead Congress to grant policy-making authority to
courts, as Congress has the resources necessary to produce detailed, court-enforced legislation.
Ideological distance
Legislative capacity captures characteristics of Congress as an institution and seeks to
explain the decision to grant policy-making authority to the federal district courts as a function of
congressional capacity to write detailed legislation. Alternatively but not exclusively, Congress
might consider the relative ideological positions of Congress, the federal district courts, and
14

administrative agencies. Legislative capacity and ideological distance, discussed in more detail
below, should be viewed as alternative explanations for the same phenomenon, focusing on
different aspects of the relationship between Congress and the courts. Both provide information
on the processes involved in deciding to grant authority to the courts.
The ideological relationship between Congress, courts, and administrative agencies might
explain the decision to grant policy-making authority. With respect to the question of whether to
delegate to an administrative agency, increased ideological distance does not necessarily mean
that delegation will not take place. Congress may turn to courts depending on the relative
ideological positions of Congress, courts, agencies, and the President. Epstein and O’Halloran
explain the decision to delegate to a federal court, or to other “non-executive” agencies, as a
function of ideological distance between the legislative branch and the executive branch.43 In his
examination of the potential oversight role of federal courts with respect to administrative
agencies, Shipan argues that members of Congress may work to increase or decrease the
participation of the courts in the policy-making process depending on their evaluation of the
relative policy positions of Congress, courts, and agencies.44
What is of interest is the ideological distance between Congress, the federal district
courts, and administrative agencies. Consider first the effect of increased ideological distance
between Congress and the federal courts. As this distance increases, the likelihood of
congressional grants of authority to the courts decreases given the growing gap between the
likely policy positions of the two institutional actors. At the same time, an increase in the
distance between Congress and administrative agencies may lead Congress to grant more policymaking authority to the federal courts given the growing gap between Congress and agencies.
The delegation literature suggests the following hypothesis:
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H2: As the ideological distance between Congress and the federal district courts increases
taking into account the ideological distance between Congress and the administrative agencies,
Congress will be less likely to pass jurisdiction-granting legislation as the courts’ policy outputs
would diverge from those preferred by Congress.
Data and measures
Legislative capacity. Definitions of legislative capacity are variations on a theme.
Indexes based on “space, salary, session length, staff, and structure,”45 “member pay, staff
member per legislator, and total days in session,”46 and “legislative pay, staff, and session
length” 47 have been used to measure legislative capacity. I focus on staff and session length for
two reasons. First, given the ability and propensity of members of Congress to raise (or lower)
their salaries, legislator pay did not seem to be a good measure of legislative capacity. Second,
staff and session length do capture two aspects of the legislative capacity concept: a resource
available to assist legislators in drafting legislation (staff) and a resource available to assist
legislators in completing their work (time). The variable Staff is a count of the number of staff
members employed by the United States Congress per session, in thousands.48 The variable
Days is a count of the number of days Congress is in session per congressional session.49 For
both Staff and Days, higher levels are conceptualized as associated with increased legislative
capacity.
Ideological distance. Ideological distance is computed using the median member of the
Congress, courts, and agencies.50 For the variables House median and Senate median, scores
were measured using Poole and Rosenthal’s DW Chamber median scores. Common Space
Scores were used for the President variable with the President standing in as a proxy for
administrative agencies.51

16

For Judge median, a new measure was computed following the methodology of Giles,
Hettinger, and Peppers.52 Taking account of the norm of senatorial courtesy, a judge is assigned
a score based on the ideology of his home state senator when senatorial courtesy is active and is
assigned a score corresponding to the President’s when it is inactive. As noted by Giles et al,
who compute an ideological score for court of appeals judges using this approach, this method is
an advantage over measures that depend solely on the appointing party of the president and
additionally allows for comparisons across branches.53 Averaging across the judges serving on
the district courts per session produces the variable Judge Median. Figure 2 displays Judge
Median for the 81st through 106th Congress.
I focus on the federal district courts and do not account for the ideology of circuit court
judges or Supreme Court justices, both of whom oversee decisions made by the district courts. It
could be argued that the courts of appeals and the Supreme Court are participants on appeal in
cases that stem from jurisdiction-granting legislation, meaning that Congress might take into
consideration the ideology of the courts of appeals and the Supreme Court when designing this
legislation. Congress might take into account where they stand on the ideological spectrum
along with the ideology of the district courts, knowing that these courts might be involved in
deciding certain policy questions. I argue, however, that a category of decisions are being made
primarily by the federal district courts with little oversight from higher courts, justifying focusing
on the ideology of federal district judges only. That is not to argue that the federal district courts
always operate free from appellate review, but rather that it is more likely than not for their
decisions not to be reviewed by a higher court.54 Congress, according to this argument,
considers the ideology of the district courts when passing jurisdiction-granting legislation
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because it is aware that it is these courts that will be making the bulk of policy decisions in these
cases.
[Figure 2 about here]
Calculating distance. If ideology matters, Congress will grant jurisdiction when the
ideological position of the median chamber member is closer to the median Judge taking into
account the distance between Congress and administrative agencies. As the ideological distance
between Congress and the district judges increase, taking in account the distance between
Congress and administrative agencies, Congress will be less likely to grant jurisdiction to the
district courts. As Congress moves closer to administrative agencies and farther away from the
district courts, the likelihood of jurisdiction-granting legislation passing should decrease. Thus,
what is of interest is the distance between Congress, the district courts, and administrative
agencies. The variable Senate Distance is calculated as the absolute value of |Senate median –
President| - |Senate median – Judge median| and the variable House Distance is the absolute
value of |House median – President| - |House median – Judge median|. For both variables this
calculation produces a value between 0 and 1 and as the value approaches 1 the likelihood of
jurisdiction-granting legislation passing should decrease.
Controls. There are a number of factors that may attenuate the ideological and
institutional effects described above. Congress may be less likely to grant new policy-making
authority to the courts if they perceive the courts as already dealing with a high number of cases.
The model controls for the number of federal district court civil cases, denoted as Cases, filed
annually, in thousands of cases. The model also controls for the effect of “unified” government
across chambers and between Congress and the Presidency. When Congress and the President
are of the same party, Congress perhaps is more willing to grant policy-making authority to the
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federal district courts, staffed under the direction of the President, than when the President and
Congress are under the control of differing parties. According to Epstein and O’Halloran, in the
realm of administrative agencies, “Congress will delegate more power to agencies under unified
government than under divided government,” balancing the need to delegate to administrative
agencies against the likelihood that the President exercises too much influence on the direction of
agency policy-making.55 Similar dynamics might be at work with respect to granting policymaking authority to the federal district courts. By similar logic, when the two chambers are
divided across party control, it may be less likely that jurisdiction-granting legislation will pass.
House members might be hesitant to create new discretion for judges when those judges are to be
chosen with the participation of Senators of a different party. When the House and Senate are of
the same party (House-Senate Unified), Congress is perhaps more likely to grant policy-making
authority to the district courts as both House and Senate members will conceivably benefit in
terms of policy outputs from increased participation of the courts as opposed when party control
is divided and one branch is ideologically aligned with the district courts. House-Senate Unified
is a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 when the same political party controls the House
and the Senate. For situations when the President and Congress are unified, the variable
Congress –President Unified takes on a value of 1 when the House, Senate, and Presidency are
controlled by the same party and 0 otherwise. As described by De Figueiredo and Tiller,
expansions of judicial power may take place in periods of alignment between the branches – the
passage of jurisdiction granting legislation should be more likely when the branches are of the
same party.56
Additionally, the model controls for the total numbers of laws passed per congressional
session (Total Laws) to account for the possible effects of otherwise increasing congressional
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activity on the number of jurisdiction-granting laws passed. Finally, the model includes a
dummy control variable for the 81st through 86th Congresses to account for periods in which
attitudes towards administrative agencies perhaps made them more attractive policy-making
venues than court (Agency trust). I theorize that attitudes towards administrative agencies and
courts during the late 1940s and 1950s mitigate against granting policy-making authority to the
federal district courts. During this time period, administrative agencies were viewed as
necessary to address problems faced by government and society. Administrative agencies
became responsible for activities normally associated with the executive, legislative, and judicial
branch with the judiciary losing the most in terms of power and responsibility to newly created
agencies. A culture of distrust regarding the willingness or ability of courts to address public
policy problems pervaded government.57 In contrast, it was thought that administrative agencies
would be staffed by expert individuals who were dedicated both to the idea of governance and to
doing the best for industry.58 It is likely that because of these prevailing attitudes during this
time period, Congress was more likely to delegate authority to administrative agencies than to
grant policy-making authority to the courts.
Results
Grants of jurisdiction are evaluated in light of legislative capacity and ideological
distance. Table 1 provides summary statistics for the variables employed in this analysis. Table
2 shows the regression results for the United States Senate while Table 3 shows the regression
results for the United States House of Representatives. Although these are times series data,
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) may be employed with time series data in the absence of serial
correlation.59 In the presence of serial correlation, OLS standard errors will be biased. The
Durbin-Watson test for serial correlation was used to determine if the results of an OLS
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regression were serially correlated and is reported below along with the OLS results. No
evidence of serial correlation was found according to this test.
[Table 1, Table 2, and Table 3 about here]
For the United States Senate model, the variable Senate Distance is negatively correlated
with Laws at the p < 0.01 level. As hypothesized, as the ideological distance between the median
Senate member and the median judge of the federal district courts increases, taking into account
the administrative agencies, it is less likely for Congress to pass jurisdiction-granting legislation.
For each unit change in the ideological distance, there is an associated decrease of approximately
thirty laws in the number of laws passed. Staff is positively correlated with Laws at the p <
0.001 level, as hypothesized. Each additional 1000 staff members, which corresponds to
increasing legislative capacity, is associated with the passage of approximately two more
jurisdiction-granting laws. While House-Senate Unified fails to meet statistical significance,
Congress-President Unified is just shy of significance at the p<0.05 level. Contrary to
expectations, the presence of unified government is associated with the passage of fewer, not
more, jurisdiction-granting laws. The reason for this finding may be the fact that when all three
branches of government are unified, delegation of policy-making authority to administrative
agencies is more likely given the partisan alignment between branches. Members of the Senate
may be more willing in such circumstances to delegate to the executive branch compared to
granting policy-making authority to the judicial branch as they have no reason to be jealous of
executive implementation of their policies. Cases is negatively and statistically significant at the
p<0.05 level. For each additional 1000 cases filed in the federal district courts, Congress passes
approximately 0.05 fewer jurisdiction-granting laws – in other words, for every 20,000
additional cases filed, Congress enacts one fewer jurisdiction-granting law. Finally, Agency trust
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is negatively correlated with Laws at the p<0.05 level. The presence of Agency trust is
associated with approximately fourteen fewer jurisdiction-granting laws passed. Consistent with
expectations, the Senate is less likely to grant policy-making authority to the district courts in
times when administrative agencies provide meaningful and trustworthy alternatives.
For the U.S. House of Representatives House Distance failed to reach conventional levels
of statistical significance, suggesting no relationship between the relative distance between the
House median, the judge median, and the administrative agencies. Members of the House do not
participate in the process of staffing either courts or agencies and their lack of participation may
explain this result. Without a stake in the make-up of the third and fourth branches, members of
the House may not take ideological proximity into consideration when deciding whether to grant
policy-making authority to the district courts. Staff – a measure of legislative capacity – is
positively correlated with the passage of jurisdiction-granting laws at the p<0.001 level. For the
House, each additional 1000 staff members is associated with approximately one additional
jurisdiction-granting law. Legislative capacity for both the House and the Senate proves to be an
important indicator of whether Congress will grant policy-making authority to the courts. Cases
is negatively correlated with the number of jurisdiction-granting laws passed at the p<0.05 level
in that for every 1000 additional cases filed, there is an associated 0.04 fewer laws. Finally,
Agency trust is statistically significant at the p<0.05 level. When Agency trust is active, as
expected, the House passes approximately twelve fewer jurisdiction-granting cases per
congressional session.
Figure 3 and Figure 4 demonstrate the effect on the dependent variable of select values of
Senate Distance and Staff for the U.S. Senate. When holding all other variables at their mean
and when Agency trust takes a value of 1 – denoting time periods in which administrative
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agencies were perhaps more trusted than courts – the number of jurisdiction-granting laws
passed decreases from 42 to 27 laws passed. This is in accordance with expectations: as Senate
Distance increases from its minimum to its maximum, the number of jurisdiction-granting laws
passed should decrease as the ideological distance between the Senate and the district courts is
increasing. Again holding all other variables as their mean and assigning a value of 1 to Agency
trust, Figure 5 shows that as levels of Staff increase, the number of jurisdiction-granting laws
passed ranges from 21 to 45. In Figure 6, Agency trust takes on a value of 0 and Senate Distance
varies while other variables are held at their means. In this scenario, the number of jurisdictionlaws passed ranges from 28 to 13 as Senate Distance approaches its maximum denoting
increasing ideological distance between the Senate and the district courts. For Staff, the number
of laws passed increases from 7 laws to 31 laws, reflecting the idea that additional legislative
capacity should translate into more jurisdiction-granting laws.60
[Figure 3 and Figure 4 about here]
Conclusion
Congress grants jurisdiction to the federal district courts, through the mechanism of
jurisdiction-granting legislation. As discussed above, Congress is more likely to pass such
legislation when it has the staffing needed to grant authority to the courts. Congress is less likely
to do so under conditions in which the ideological distance between the Senate, the
administrative agencies, and the courts increases. These results suggest a number of conclusions
regarding the relationship between Congress and the federal district courts.
First, Congress routinely grants jurisdiction to the federal district courts. This suggests
an active role for Congress in determining the boundaries of what courts are able to accomplish.
The district courts are not self-organizing but rather depend on Congress to make choices
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regarding their jurisdiction. Congress frequently makes such choices, granting jurisdiction to the
federal district courts in at least 10 laws per congressional session. Coupled with the frequency
with which Congress strips jurisdiction from the federal courts, the data collected for this study
speak to the consistent attention given to the courts by Congress.61
Second, by granting jurisdiction, Congress is taking action that empowers the federal
district courts to participate in the policy process. Congress makes choices to establish courts as
venues through which certain questions are to be asked and answered, either by establishing
courts as primary venues to which individuals and groups originally turn or by creating an
oversight role for courts as part of the regulatory process. Recognizing these causes of judicial
participation in the policy-making process is important to understanding trends in courts’
involvement in the policy process. It has long been recognized that federal courts at all levels are
increasingly involved in deciding important policy questions. Compared to earlier periods in
United States history, courts today are involved in multiple aspects of Americans’ lives and even
have taken up issues heretofore considered the sole provenance of the legislative and executive
branches.
Known as the “judicialization of politics,” 62 this process has resulted in the involvement
of the federal courts in the “administration and operation of schools, prisons and jails, mental
health centers, public housing authorities, and juvenile detention facilities”63 and involved courts
in numerous policy areas such as environmental law and abortion policy.64 The present study
argues that trends associated with the judicialization of politics might be attributed to decisions
made by Congress regarding how courts participate in the policy process. If Congress plays an
active role in granting courts jurisdiction, understanding what issues courts consider becomes
more complicated than under a model in which courts are solely responsible for setting their
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agendas. The results here suggest an antecedent stage to the judicial agenda-setting process in
which Congress’s choices influence who may sue, when they may sue, and which issues they
may raise.
Third, decisions of whether to grant jurisdiction to the courts are part of the legislative
process.65 Congress therefore serves as an important link between the public, their elected
representatives, and the courts. When courts participate in the policy process, they are doing so
in part because of decisions made by elected officials. Congress has opportunities throughout
the legislative process to consider the implications of its decisions regarding the participation of
the courts in the policy process. While many scholars bemoan the lack of meaningful checks on
the judiciary, the frequency with which Congress grants (and removes) jurisdiction demonstrates
that Congress is not powerless when it comes to the federal courts.
A more comprehensive picture of the judicial agenda-setting process emerges when
scholars take into consideration Congress’s role in establishing the jurisdiction of the federal
courts. Judges set their agendas in response to a number of influences, which includes the
jurisdiction granted to them by Congress. Without these congressional grants, courts would have
no power or authority. With these grants, litigants, acting as individuals or as part of groups,
take advantage of legislatively-created opportunities and bring their cases to court with an
understanding of what courts are able to do under the law.

1

"Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill (2010)," The New York Times 2010, Hornbeck Offshore Services, L.L.C. Et Al. Versus

Kenneth Lee "Ken" Salazar Et Al., 1 (2010).
2

Charlie Savage, "Drilling Ban Blocked; U.S. Will Issue New Order," The New York Times, June 22, 2010 2010,

Bryan Walsh, "Obama's Drilling Moratorium Is Moratoriumed," Time 2010.

25

3

Ariane de Vogue and Jake Tapper, "Judge Drills Hole in Deepwater Ban; Obama Promises Immediate Appeal,"

ABC News 2010.
4

Howard Gillman and Cornell W. Clayton, The Supreme Court in American Politics: New Institutionalist

Interpretations (Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 1999), 1.
5

Gillman and Clayton, The Supreme Court in American Politics, 2.

6

Mark Graber, "The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary," Studies in American

Political Development 7, no. Spring (1993), Howard Gillman, "How Political Parties Can Use the Courts to
Advance Their Agendas: Federal Courts in the United States, 1875-1891," The American Political Science Review
96, no. 3 (2002), ———, "Party Politics and Constitutional Change: The Political Origins of Liberal Judicial
Activism," in The Supreme Court and American Political Development, ed. Ronald Kahn and Ken I. Kersch
(Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2006), Paul Frymer, "Acting When Elected Officials Won't: Federal
Courts and Civil Rights Enforcement in U.S. Labor Unions, 1935-85," The American Political Science Review 97,
no. 3 (2003), George I. Lovell, Legislative Deferrals: Statutory Ambiguity, Judicial Power, and American
Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), Justin Crowe, "The Forging of Judicial Autonomy:
Political Entrepreneurship and the Reforms of William Howard Taft," Journal of Politics 69, no. 1 (2007).
7

Graber, “The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty,” 36-7.

8

Graber, “The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty,” 37, Lovell, Legislative Deferrals, 20.

9

Graber, “The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty,” Gillman, “How Political Parties Can Use the Courts,” Lovell,

Legislative Deferrals, Joseph L. Smith, "Congress Opens the Courthouse Doors: Statutory Changes to Judicial
Review under the Clean Air Act," Political Research Quarterly 58, no. 1 (2005).
10

Graber, “The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty.”

11

Gillman, “How Political Parties Can Use the Courts.”

12

Graber, “The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty,” Lovell, Legislative Deferrals.

13

Charles R. Shipan, "The Legislative Design of Judicial Review: A Formal Analysis," Journal of Theoretical

Politics 12, no. 3 (2000)., Smith, “Congress Opens the Courthouse Doors.”
14

Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, Agendas and Instability in American Politics (Chicago: University of

Chicago Press, 1993), 32.
15

Crowe, “Forging of Judicial Autonomy,” 7.

26

16

Gillman, “How Political Parties Can Use the Courts,” Mark Graber, "Legal, Strategic, or Legal Strategy: Deciding

to Decide During the Civil War and Reconstruction," in The Supreme Court and American Political Development,
ed. Ronald Kahn and Kenneth I. Kersch (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2006).
17

This measure does not capture a number of equally important court-empowering mechanisms employed by

Congress including authorization of class action suits, new causes of legal action, and contingency fees. See, e.g.,
Sean Farhang, "Public Regulation and Private Lawsuits in the American Separation of Powers System," American
Journal of Political Science 52, no. 4 (2008), Jeb Barnes, "Bringing the Courts Back In: Interbranch Perspectives on
the Role of Courts in American Politics and Policy Making," Annual Review of Political Science 10 (2007)..
18

Jeffrey A. Segal and Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited (Cambridge, UK:

Cambridge University Press, 2002), 240.
19

Segal and Spaeth, Attitudinal Model Revisited, 250 emphasis added.

20

Richard Pacelle, The Transformation of the Supreme Court's Agenda: From the New Deal to the Reagan

Administration (Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1991), 15 emphasis added.
21

Drew Noble Lanier, Of Time and Judicial Behavior: United States Supreme Court Agenda-Setting and Decision-

Making, 1888-1997 (Selinsgrove [Pa.]: Susquehanna University Press, 2003), 212.
22

Graber, “The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty,” Shipan, “Legislative Design.”

23

Graber, “The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty,” 47-8.

24

Shipan, “Legislative Design,” 277.

25

Lovell, Legislative Deferrals.

26

Gillman, “How Political Parties Can Use the Courts,” Gillman, “Party Politics and Constitutional Change.”

27

Lovell, Legislative Deferrals; Smith, “Congress Opens the Courthouse Doors.”

28

Gillman, “How Political Parties Can Use the Courts,” 512.

29

Initially, delegation could be justified as acceptable as Congress would be delegating to experts with the

knowledge and drive to produce sound public policy. However, in the time period after World War II questions
arose concerning assumptions motivating earlier visions of delegation, especially that barriers against participation
were low and that those wishing to participate in the agency process were able to participate. Administrative
agencies were increasingly seen as beholden to the interests of industry and as no longer serving the interest of the
public. Decision-making was increasingly regarded as taking place behind closed doors, or behind the aegis of

27

agency discretion. In the 1960s and 1970s, members of Congress were motivated by a desire to provide more
direction to agencies to prevent agencies from straying too far from the stated purpose of legislation, and to control
generally the executive branch. Delegation takes place in present times against this historical backdrop of looking to
benefit from agency expertise while at the same time mitigating against agency capture. See, e.g., James M. Landis,
The Administrative Process (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1938), Martin M. Shapiro, Who Guards the
Guardians?: Judicial Control of Administration (Athens, GA.: University of Georgia Press, 1988), Richard B.
Stewart, "The Reformation of American Administrative Law," Harvard Law Review 88, no. 8 (1975), R. Shep
Melnick, Between the Lines: Interpreting Welfare Rights (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1994).
30

The Federal Crop Insurance Act 81-268.

31

Housing Act of 1954., 83-560.

32

Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 92-522.

33

Special Health Revenue Sharing Act of 1975.

34

Fisheries and Conservation Management, 99-659.

35

Fisheries Act of 1995, 104-43.

36

Christopher Z. Mooney, "Measuring U.S. State Legislative Professionalism: An Evaluation of Five Indices," State

& Local Government Review 26, no. 2 (1994)..
37

James D. King, "Changes in Professionalism in U. S. State Legislatures," Legislative Studies Quarterly 25, no. 2

(2000).
38

William D. Berry, Michael B. Berkman, and Stuart Schneiderman, "Legislative Professionalism and Incumbent

Reelection: The Development of Institutional Boundaries," The American Political Science Review 94, no. 4 (2000):
859.
39

Peter H. Aranson, Ernest Gellhorn, and Glen O. Robinson, "A Theory of Legislative Delegation," Cornell Law

Review 68 (1982): 21, David Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloran, "Administrative Procedures, Information, and Agency
Discretion," American Journal of Political Science 38, no. 3 (1994): 698, Kathleen Bawn, "Political Control Versus
Expertise: Congressional Choices About Administrative Procedures," The American Political Science Review 89,
no. 1 (1995): 62, David Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloran, Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach
to Policy Making under Separate Powers, Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions. (Cambridge, U.K. ; New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 48.

28

40

John D. Huber, Charles R. Shipan, and Madelaine Pfahler, "Legislatures and Statutory Control of Bureaucracy,"

American Journal of Political Science 45, no. 2 (2001), Matthew Potoski, "Designing Bureaucratic Responsiveness:
Administrative Procedures and Agency Choice in State Environmental Policy," State Politics and Policy Quarterly
2, no. 1 (2002). Despite possessing legislative capacity, Congress may still decide to include some safeguards in its
delegation to administrative agencies.
41

Morris P. Fiorina, "Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or Administrative Process?," Public

Choice 39, no. 1 (1982), ———, "Legislator Uncertainty, Legislative Control, and the Delegation of Legislative
Power," Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 2, no. 1 (1986).
42

Fiorina calls the “dichotomization of the administrative and legal systems an … over-simplification” one that

glosses over processes in which agencies participate in legal proceedings and courts are always present “in the
background” with respect to agency enforcement of statutes in Fiorina, “Legislator Uncertainty”, 36.
43

Epstein and O'Halloran, Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making under

Separate Powers, 77-81, 129-38.
44

Shipan, “Legislative Design.”

45

Berry et al., “Legislative Professionalism and Incumbent Reelection,” 859

46

Peverill Squire, "Legislative Professionalization and Membership Diversity in State Legislatures," Legislative

Studies Quarterly 17, no. 1 (1992): 71.
47

Mooney,” Measuring U.S. State Legislative Professionalism,” 73.

48

Susan B. Carter et al., Historical Statistics of the United States Millennial Edition Online (New York: Cambridge

University Press, 2006).
49

United States Congress, "Congressional Directory," ed. Government Printing Office (Washington, D.C.: U.S.

Government Printing Office, 2009), 534-9.
50

Dawn M. Chutkow, "Jurisdiction Stripping: Litigation, Ideology, and Congressional Control of the Courts," The

Journal of Politics 70, no. 04 (2008): 1057.
51

These data were downloaded from http://www.voteview.com/index.asp, last accessed August 1, 2010.

52

Micheal W. Giles, Virginia A. Hettinger, and Todd Peppers, "Picking Federal Judges: A Note on Policy and

Partisan Selection Agendas," Political Research Quarterly 54, no. 3 (2001).
53

Giles et al., “Picking Federal Judges,” 630-1.

29

54

C. K. Rowland and Robert A. Carp, Politics and Judgment in Federal District Courts (Lawrence: University Press

of Kansas, 1996), 8.
55

Epstein and O’Halloran, “Divided Government,” 382-3.

56

John M. De Figueiredo and Emerson H. Tiller, "Congressional Control of the Courts: A Theoretical and Empirical

Analysis of Expansion of the Federal Judiciary," Journal of Law and Economics 39, no. 2 (1996).
57

Landis, Administrative Process, 30-40, 124-6, Shapiro Who Guards?

58

Landis, Administrative Process, 26.

59

John Fox, Applied Regression Analysis, Linear Models, and Related Models (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage

Publications, Inc., 1997), 381, Jeffrey M. Wooldridge, Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach, 2nd ed.
(Mason, OH: Thomson Learning, 2003).
60

In all these calculations, House-Senate Unified and Congress-President Unified take on a value of 0.

61

See, e.g., Chutkow, “Jurisdiction-Stripping.”

62

Torbjorn Vallinder, "When the Courts Go Marching In," in The Global Expansion of Judicial Power, ed. C. Neal

Tate and Torbjorn Vallinder (New York: New York University Press, 1995), Cornell W. Clayton, "The Supply and
Demand Sides of Judicial Policy-Making (or, Why Be So Positive About the Judicialization of Politics?)," Law &
Contemporary Problems 65, no. 3 (2002), John Ferejohn, "Judicializing Politics, Politicizing Law," Law &
Contemporary Problems 65, no. 41 (2002).
63

William A. Taggart, "Redefining the Power of the Federal Judiciary: The Impact of Court-Ordered Prison Reform

on State Expenditures for Corrections," Law & Society Review 23, no. 2 (1989): 242.
64

Rowland and Carp, Politics and Judgment, 6-10.

65

Lovell, Legislative Deferrals; Smith, “Congress Opens the Courthouse Doors.”

30

Figure 1. Number of Jurisdiction-Granting Laws Passed by the U.S. Congress, 81st – 106th
Congress.
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Figure 2. Median judge ideology score for the 81st through 106th Congress.
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Table 1. Summary Statistics
Variable
Mean
Laws
Senate Distance
House Distance
Staff (per 1000)
Days
Cases (per 1000)
Total Laws
House-Senate
Unified
Congress-President
Unified
Agency trust

Minimum

Maximum

29
0.31
0.31
31.25
601.5
287
652
--

Standard
Deviation
11
0.17
0.18
6.81
73.65
167.6
153
--

10
0.01
0.00075
22
417
108.043
333
0

51
0.53
0.646
40
704
528.8
992
1

--

--

0

1

--

--

0

1
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Table 2. U.S. Senate: Number of Jurisdiction- Granting Laws Passed, 81st – 106th Congress
United States Senate
Senate Distance
-29.7896*
(13.1683)
Staff (per 1000)
1.375***
(0.3415)
Days
0.0412
(0.0282)
House-Senate Unified
0.6093
(3.8301)
Congress-President Unified
-7.012
(3.4529)
Cases (per 1000)
-0.0459**
(0.0135)
Total Laws
0.0163
(0.0116)
Agency trust
-13.9828*
(5.4011)
Notes: p<0.05*, p<0.01**, p<0.001***. Cell entries are OLS coefficients with standard errors in
parenthesis. Durbin-Watson d-statistic (9, 26) = 1.924108.
Table 3. U.S. House: Number of Jurisdiction-Granting Laws Passed, 81st – 106 Congress
U.S. House of Representatives
House Distance
-20.3048
(12.04)
Staff (per 1000)
1.42***
(0.3588
Days
0.0276
(0.0283)
House-Senate Unified
-0.31101
(4.2011)
Congress-President Unified
-5.0492
(3.3467)
Cases (per 1000)
-0.0446**
(0.0144)
Total Laws
0.0131
(0.01223)
Agency trust
-11.9562*
(5.4937)
Notes: p<0.05*, p<0.01**, p<0.001***. Cell entries are OLS coefficients with standard errors in
parenthesis. Durbin-Watson d-statistic (9, 26) = 1.950534
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Figure 3. U.S. Senate: Number of Jurisdiction-Laws Passed for Select Values of Senate Distance
and Staff with 95% Confidence Intervals.
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Figure 4. U.S. Senate: Number of Jurisdiction-Granting Laws Passed for Select Values of Senate
Distance and Staff, with 95% Confidence Intervals.
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